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NOTES AND COMMENTS
whether such property was included in the rate base inventory of the
owner or in that of the lessee, since the ultimate result upon both the
utilities and the public would be the same. An Act of Congress giv-
ing the Commission similar authority over all leases of lines and
equipment as it now possesses over extensions and withdrawals 15
and over security issues16 would perhaps produce the end desired.
HERMAN S. MERRELL.
Quasi-Contracts-Filling Stations-Recovery by Lessee for
Defects in Equipment
Plaintiff orally contracted to purchase gasoline and oil daily
from defendant at one cent per gallon above tank wagon prices, the
one cent being paid as rent for the premises and tanks and gasoline
pumps. Within sixty days plaintiff found he was losing money
and a series of complaints to the defendant suggesting that there
was a leak in the tanks elicited as many assurances from the de-
fendant that there could be no leaks. Finally defendant dug up the
tanks and found a leak therein. Plaintiff alleged defendant was
under a duty to inspect the tanks and to keep them in repair, and
sued for loss sustaified by the leakage. Defendant's demurrer to
the complaint was overruled and this was sustained on appeal.'
The possibility that suit upon the facts above might be success-
fully based on landlord and tenant law does not present itself. It
is settled law that in the absence of a covenant to the contrary, there
is no duty on the lessor to keep the premises in repair.2 And it
is generally held that the lessor does not impliedly covenant that
the premises are suitable for the use which the lessee intends to put
them to.a
The North Carolina court based its decision on the implied con-
tract growing out of the assurances by the defendant and the re-
liance thereon by the plaintiff. The opinion emphasized the gen-
erality with which a cause of action for money received may be
"41 STAT. 477, 49 U. S. C. A. §1 (18) (1920).
2141 STAT. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. §20a (1920).
'Andrews v. National Oil Co, 204 N. C. 268, 168 S. E. 228 (1933).
2 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 87; Richmond v. Standard Elkhorn
Coal Co., 222 Ky. 150, 300 S. W. 359 (1927), 58 A. L. R. 1423 (1929) ; Smith-
field Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N. C. 255, 72 S. E. 312 (1911),
36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907.
'Duffy v. Hartsfield, 180 N. C. 151, 104 S. E. 139 (1920); Federal Metal
Bed Co. v. Alpha Sign Co., 289 Pa. 175, 137 Atl. 189 (1927); Plaza Amuse-
ment Co. v. Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 131 So. 350 (1930); Smithfield Im-
provement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, supra note 2.
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alleged,4 unfortunately without extensive reference to North Carolina
authorities dealing with the action.5
Only one case similar on its facts to the principal case has been
found.6 The Mississippi court specifically recognized the usual sit-
uation wherein the lessor, unless he covenants to the contrary, is
under no duty to repair the premises and did not question the sound-
ness of this doctrine. However, it pointed out that the leasing of a
filling station under terms whereby the lessee was to sell only the
products -of the lessor and use the premises only for this purpose
made the relationship more than a mere landlord and tenant rela-
tion. The court concluded that the enterprise was a joint business
in which both parties were interested and allowed a recovery, hold-
ing that the lessor impliedly warranted the fitness of the equipment.
Stress was laid upon the fact that the 'lessor had once previously
attempted to repair the pumps as showing that the parties recog-
nized the existence of an implied warranty. Thus by rather un-
usual reasoning the Mississippi court reached what seems to be a
desirable result.
The usual standard form contract used by distributors leasing
filling stations contains no clause wherein the lessor assumes the
responsibility for repairing the equipment 7 The actual practice in
this respect, however, is that the distributor will, upon complaint by
the lessee, make reasonable efforts to remedy the defect; but this as-
sumption of duty seems to rest upon a desire to promote efficiency
and expedite sales rather than upon any contractual basis.8 In view
'"When defendant is proved to have in his hands the money of the plaintiff
which ex equo et bono, he ought to refund, the law conclusively presumes
that he has promised to do so.... The defendant insists that fraud is not suf-
ficiently pleaded, but the facts warrant a recovery for money had and received,
and the complaint by liberal construction, is broad enough to support such a
theory."
'Money paid voluntarily with a knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered
back. Commissioners of Macon Co. v. Commissioners of Jackson Co. 75
N. C. 240 (1876) ; Brummitt v. MeGuire, 107 N. C. 351, 12 S. E. 191 (1890) ;
Bank v. Taylor, 122 N. C. 569, 29 S. E. 831 (1898). But a payment under a
mistake of fact may be recovered. Pool v. Allen, 29 N. C. 120 (1846) ; Worth
v. Stewart, 122 N. C. 258, 29 S. E. 579 (1898) ; Simms v. Vick, 151 N. C. 79,
65 S. E. 621 (1909), 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 517, 18 Ann. Cas. 669; Sanders v.
Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916). Money paid under a contract,
continuance of which was induced by defendant's false representations may
be recovered. Whitehurst v. Insurance Co. 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908)
Jones v. Insurance Co. 151 N. C. 56, 65 S. E. 611 (1909).
'Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Rayner, 159 Miss. 783, 132 So. 739 (1931), 83 A.
L. R. 1426 (1933).
7 Information given writer by various filling station operators.8 Ibid.
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of the rapid growth of this relatively new business and the frequency
with which the lessee finds himself in the position of the plaintiffs
in the two cases noted, the decisions in these- cases allowing recovery
and the bases upon which the cause of action was worked out are
highly significant.
J. C. EAGLES, JR.
Receivers-Enjoining Other Suits-Judgments in
Other Suits as Liens.
An action in the nature of a creditors' bill was brought by a sim-
ple contract creditor against a debtor alleged to be solvent. The
debtor joined in plaintiff's request for the appointment of a receiver.
A receiver was appointed, and the court enjoined further prosecu-
tion of pending suits brought by other creditors. On motion, the
restraining order was vacated and the court ordered that those
creditors who had brought their actions prior to the receivership
proceedings be permitted to proceed to judgment and that their
judgments be claims in the receivership prior to the claims of the
general creditors. Held: The order allowing the priority was correct.1
Generally, an equity court appointing a receiver has inherent
power to protect his possession of the debtor's property. Interfer-
ence with that possession may be enjoined at the time of the appoint-
ment 2 or later upon petition by the receiver in the receivership pro-
ceedings.3 One interfering with his possession is subject to punish-
ment for contempt, and this is true even where there is no in-
junctive order.4 The property is not subject to attachment, 5 gar-
nishment,6 or execution 7 without the consent of the court, but execu-
IDillard v. Walker, 204 N. C. 67, 167 S. E. 632 (1933).
' Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N. D. Ill. 1932).
'Virginia, T. & C. Steel & Iron Co. v. Bristol Land Co., 88 Fed. 134 (C.
C. W. D. Va. 1898) ; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Felton, 103 Fed. 227 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1900); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Richmond Light &
R. Co., 267 Fed. 493 (E. D. N. Y. 1920).
"In re Marcus, 21 F. (2d) 480 (W. D. Pa. 1924) ; Coker v. Norman, 162
Ga. 351, 133 S. E. 740 (1926).
'Central Trust Co. v. Wheeling .& L: E. R. Co., 189 Fed. 82 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1911) ; Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923); see
Ewing v. Ewing Planing Mill, 183 Iowa 711, 167 N. W. 607 (1918).
'Fleeger v. Swift, 122 Kan. 6, 251 Pac. 187 (1926).
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 79 Fed. 389 (C. C. E.
D. Pa. 1897); Pelletier v. Greenville Lumber Co., 123 N. C. 596, 31 S. E.
855, 68 Am. St. Rep. 837 (1898); see Shapiro v. Wilgus, 55 F. (2d) 234,
235 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931); cf. Meyers v. Washington Heights Land Co.,
107 W. Va. 632, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
